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Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency:
an experiment
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Abstract We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bar-
gaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information
context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of un-
known type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while
in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two
principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents
affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In
an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these in-
efficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In
contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it
increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’
informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high in-
equality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly
high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract
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menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose
more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that compe-
tition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition
between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
Keywords Experiment · Hidden information · Bargaining power · Competition ·
Efficiency
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1 Introduction
The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a “vital and lively
field of economic research” (2001 Nobel Prize committee) for decades. The classic
‘lemons’ paper (Akerlof 1970) illustrated the point that asymmetric information led
to economic inefficiency, and could even destroy an efficient market. Since the semi-
nal works of Vickrey (1961) and Mirrlees (1971), research on mechanism design has
sought ways to minimize or eliminate this problem.1 In an environment with hidden
information (sometimes characterized as adverse selection), each agent knows more
about her2 ‘type’ than the principal does at the time of contracting. In the standard
labor scenario, a firm hires a worker but knows less than the worker does about her
innate work disutility. Other typical applications include a monopolist who is trying
to price discriminate between buyers with different (privately known) willingness to
pay, or a regulator who wants to obtain the highest efficient output from a utility
company with private information about its cost.3
The fact that agents know their own ability levels while principals may not causes
difficulties in contracting, as an agent may not choose the action that is in the best
interest of the principal. If outcomes are related to actions, firms with complete infor-
mation could design ‘first-best’ contracts that theoretically induce truthful revelation
of types and generate economic efficiency by making the contract contingent on the
outcome. However, in contracting under hidden information, the problem is how to
induce the efficient action without observing the agent’s true type; in this case, it is
typically necessary to devise ‘second-best’ contracts that lead to separation of types,
but which are somewhat distorted and less than fully efficient.
In this paper we report the results of experiments designed to test the influence
of competition when there is hidden information. This can be seen as a question of
organizational or institutional design—what effects do different rules and markets
1Applications include public and regulatory economics (Laffont and Tirole 1993), labor economics
(Lazear 1999), financial economics (Freixas and Rochet 1997), business management (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992), and development economics (Ray 1998).
2Throughout this paper we assume that the principals are male and the agents are female.
3One-shot contracts are common in consumer transactions. In the public sector, government procurement
is often conducted on a one-shot basis.
2
Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment
have on performance and efficiency?4 We examine how differing degrees of relative
bargaining power between principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency when
there is a problem of hidden information.
Our approach is to consider three environments that differ according to the type
of competition present in the environment. In our benchmark case, each principal is
matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can
select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between
the contract menus offered by two principals. Principals can choose to offer one of
six feasible contract menus, which are held constant across our treatments; in turn,
agents can select high or low effort, or reject the contract menu entirely and receive
reservation payoffs. We derive the equilibrium predictions for each environment and
examine the outcomes in each treatment, ranking the institutions as a function of their
relative efficiency, both in terms of effort and the probability of trade.
In this respect theory provides a first answer. To understand the theoretical ef-
ficiency ranking, it is important to realize that incomplete information in markets
creates inefficiencies because the agents have a certain monopoly power. More pre-
cisely, they are the sole ‘owners’ of a valuable resource – information about their
type. We first show from a theoretical point of view how different degrees of bargain-
ing power between principals and agents, related to various degrees of competition in
the market, affect outcomes and efficiency. In an environment where principals com-
pete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they
are insensitive to the number of principals. In an environment where agents compete
to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically and increases in the relative number
of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power.
However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized
by multiple equilibria, which may have important behavioral implications in the field
if people have social preferences such as inequality aversion.
Our experiment constitutes the first test of the impact of varying the relative bar-
gaining power between principals and agents on the selection of contracts in the pres-
ence of both heterogeneous agents and hidden information. Our results are mostly
supportive of the theory and the major implication is that the bargaining power di-
rectly affects the choice of contract menus. In comparison with environments in
which there is no competition, our experiment finds that the institutional environ-
ment in which agents compete against each other improves efficiency as far as we
consider the contracting pairs.
Even though, in general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between
the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment,
there is a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus
over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade,
and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
We observe a fairly high degree of separation of agents’ types in the choices made
in response to the various contract menus; interestingly, with agent competition we
4Although we use the standard static screening model, it is worth noting that Kanemoto and MacLeod
(1992) examine the effect of competition in a dynamic environment and find that one obtains the first-best
outcome if there is sufficient competition for workers, even with asymmetric information.
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observe the more able agents strategically foregoing the option that would pay them
more (if they are chosen), in order to signal their type by choosing the option that
less able agents should never choose. Our data also show considerable evidence of
changes in behavior over time, as participants learn what is effective and what is not.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We review the relevant liter-
ature in Sect. 2, and we describe our theoretical model and derive its predictions in
Sect. 3. We present our experimental design and implementation in Sect. 4, with the
results given in Sect. 5. We conclude in Sect. 6.
2 Related literature
Perhaps due to the complexity of business relationships, it is difficult to find sup-
port from field data for principal-agent theory. While there has been considerable
theoretical work on contracts in recent decades, empirical tests of the theory have
long remained scarce, particularly as far as hidden information is concerned. The
Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanié (2003) surveys show that the econo-
metrics of contracts has recently become a burgeoning field of research. However,
the latter study points out that a number of empirical tests suffer from selection and
endogeneity biases. In addition, due to the lack of data on contracts many theoretical
models have not yet been tested. These difficulties explain why few empirical tests
of the hidden-information problem are available in the literature (see notably Cawley
and Philipson 1999; Chiappori and Salanié 2000; Dahlby 1983; Dione and Doherty
1994; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004; Genesove 1993; Puelz and Snow 1994; Young
and Burke 2001). Given the difficulties inherent with field data in this area, labora-
tory experiments offer a complementary approach that offers some promise, since it
is possible to isolate and vary the factors of interest while keeping all others constant.
Previous experimental studies on asymmetric information have typically exam-
ined contracting with hidden action (moral hazard), where effort is not contractible
(see notably Anderhub et al. 2002; Berg et al. 1992; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006;
DeJong et al. 1985; Keser and Willinger 2000; Königstein 2001). However, there
is little experimental work on contracting with hidden information about an agent’s
type. A few studies confirm the existence of a market for “lemons” (see Lynch et al.
1986, in oral double auctions, and Holt and Sherman 1990, in posted-offer auctions),
while Brandts and Holt (1992) and Banks et al. (1994) provide mixed evidence in sig-
naling games. Miller and Plott (1985) show that market processes allow the buyers to
extract private information from the sellers, in an environment in which the propor-
tion of buyers varies but is never greater than the number of sellers. Beyond market
processes, it has also been shown that agents are more likely to select actions accord-
ing to their types when more equitable menus are proposed (Cabrales and Charness
forthcoming, in the context of team production) and when communication is allowed
(Charness and Dufwenberg forthcoming). Finally, a few articles (Chaudhuri 1998;
Cooper et al. 1999; Charness et al. forthcoming) study the dynamic contracting prob-
lem. However, we are unaware of any previous study that considers the effect of
varying, in a static framework, the relative bargaining power in contracts with either
excess principals or excess agents.
One might predict that different relative bargaining power for principals and agents
should lead to different contract menus being selected. However, the evidence from
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the handful of experimental papers on the effects of unbalanced competition on
the outcomes between principals and agents is somewhat mixed. Fischbacher et al.
(2009) demonstrate that the introduction of even a small amount of competition leads
to large behavioral changes. Roth et al. (1991) find that principals capture nearly
the entire surplus when agents compete in a demand game, while Grosskopf (2003)
shows, in an ultimatum bargaining game with responders’ competition, that demands
evolves more over time than in the game with no competition. Davis and Holt (1994)
find that the ability of a buyer to switch between sellers provides a strong incentive
to develop reputation in a repeated game. Charness et al. (forthcoming) show how
competition can eliminate the ratchet effect. In contrast, other studies find that com-
petition does not eliminate fairness when contracts are incomplete (see Brandts and
Charness 2004, and Fehr et al. 1998). Thus, it is not clear ex ante what effects compe-
tition will have on the static hidden-information problem. This is even more the case
when competition is unbalanced, with either excess firms or excess workers.
3 The model
In this section we describe the theoretical model that serves as the basis for the ex-
perimental design. In this game, the principal offers one contract that is intended for
low-ability-type agents and one contract intended for high-ability-type agents; these
contracts are designed such that the agents have an incentive to self-select the ap-
propriate contract. We vary the bargaining power by altering the relative proportion
of principals and agents. As a preview, we note that the case with competition be-
tween principals (more principals than agents) yields a solution that is invariant to the
number of agents and is sometimes efficient. On the other hand, the case of competi-
tion between agents is not invariant to the (relative) number of agents. The presence
of more agents relaxes the binding incentive-compatibility constraint (for the high-
ability type), yielding a level of effort that decreases towards the efficient level with
the number of agents. In the limit, the only relevant constraint for the high-ability
type agent is the participation constraint. As a result, there are no inefficiencies.
Imagine that a firm needs one worker in order to be able to operate. The profits for
the firm when it is operating are:
 = e − w
where e, w are the effort levels and wages of the worker. Each worker has a utility
function which depends on her ability type j ∈ {H,L}, which is her private informa-
tion:
uj (e,w) = w − kj2 e
2
where kH = 1 and kL = k > 1. That is, the high-ability agent has a lower cost of
effort than the low-ability type. Thus, only the individual agent knows j , but e is
observable and contractible.
From the utility functions of the principal and the agents, the first-best effort levels
are:
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eˆj = 1
kj
, j ∈ {H,L} (1)
We call eˆj the efficient level of effort.5 Let U be the outside option of the worker
(which we assume for simplicity to be type-independent); we can induce optimal
effort, with:
wˆj = U + 12kj , j ∈ {H,L}
If the (independent) probability that an agent is a high- or low-ability type is de-
noted respectively by pH or pL, then the expected (optimal) profits for the principal
are given by:
E = pL
2kL
+ pH
2kH
− U
In order to make some comparisons across treatments we hold this first-best con-
tract fixed in all the treatments. However, the second-best optimal equilibrium con-
tracts, when the types are private information of the agents, depend on the structure
of the market, which is our treatment variable. Then the equilibrium contract menu
in the Benchmark (B) treatment, with one principal and one agent, results from the
solution of the maximization program:
max
wH ,wL,eH ,eL
pH (eH − wH) + pL(eL − wL)
subject to wH − kH2 (eH )
2 ≥ U (IRH )
wL − kL2 (eL)
2 ≥ U (IRL)
wH − kH2 (eH )
2 ≥ wL − kH2 (eL)
2 (ICH )
wL − kL2 (eL)
2 ≥ wH − kL2 (eH )
2 (ICL)
where (IRj ) and (ICj ) are respectively the individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility constraints of an agent of ability type j ∈ {H,L}. As usual in these prob-
lems (see for example Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Ch. 14C), it turns out that the active
constraints in the optimal solution are (IRL) and (ICH ), so that the solution is:
eBH =
1
kH
= 1; eBL =
pL
kL − kH (1 − pL) =
1
kL + 1−pLpL (kL − kH )
;
wBL = U +
kL
2
(eBL)
2; wBH =
1
2
+ wBL −
1
2
(eBL)
2
(2)
5This is an appropriate terminology because in all the Pareto-efficient allocations of this problem (with
complete information) the level of effort is always eˆj . This is so because of the quasi-linearity of the
utility function of the agents, a common assumption in this field. Thus, the Pareto-efficient allocations
only differ in the wages and profits of the principal and agent.
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The high-ability type of agent provides the ‘efficient’ level of effort and obtains
utility above U . These informational rents (rents are defined here as the utility an
agent gets above her reservation utility) are equal to:
wBH −
1
2
− U = kL − 1
2
(eBL)
2 (2e)
The effort of the low-ability type of agent is ‘inefficiently’ low and she obtains no
rents, because she is held to the reservation value (the (IRL) constraint is binding).
This is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game.
Assume now that the each principal is matched with three agents (this is the Ex-
cess Agent, or EA, treatment). Then an equilibrium contract menu results from the
solution of a slightly different maximization program. Given that high-ability types
are ‘harder-working’ (they have a lower disutility of effort), they cost less per unit of
output. Thus when any of the matched agents chooses the contract designed for the
high-ability type, the principal always chooses her. If more than one agent chooses
the high contract, the principal chooses randomly among those selecting the high
contract.6,7
max
wH ,wL,eH ,eL
(1 − p3L)(eH − wH) + p3L(eL − wL)
subject to wL − kL2 (eL)
2 ≥ U
(
(1 − pL)2
3
+ 2 (1 − pL)pL
2
+ p2L
)(
wH − kH2 (eH )
2
)
+
(
1 − (1 − pL)
2
3
− 2 (1 − pL)pL
2
− p2L
)
U
≥ p
3
L
3
(
wL − kH2 (eL)
2
)
+
(
1 − p
3
L
3
)
U (ICH )
The (ICH ) can also be written
wH − kH2 (eH )
2 ≥ q
(
wL − kH2 (eL)
2
)
+ (1 − q)U (ICH )
where
q =
p3L
3
(1−pL)2
3 + 2 (1−pL)pL2 + p2L
.
6We only write the binding constraints, in what follows.
7In our model the principal always prefers the high-ability agent. For this to be true we need to show:
wH − wL ≤ eH − eL, but because of the binding ICH ,wH − wL = kH2 (eH − eL)(eH + eL), which
means that wH − wL ≤ eH − eL is satisfied if kH2 (eH + eL) ≤ 1. This is true because kH2 (eH + eL) ≤
kH
2 (2eH ) = kH2 (2 1kH ) = 1.
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The solution is now:
eEAH =
1
kH
= 1; eEAL =
1
kL + (1−pL)3
p3L
q(kL − kH )
;
wEAL = U +
kL
2
(eEAL )
2; wEAH =
1
2
+ wEAL −
1
2
(eEAL )
2
(3)
The effort of the low-ability type of agent in the EA treatment, eEAL , is closer to the
efficient effort (eˆL) than that in the B treatment (eBL). To see this note that both eEAL
and eBL are smaller than eˆL = 1kL ; we now show eEAL > eBL , so that the distortion is
lower in EA than in B:
eEAL =
1
kL + (1−pL)3
p3L
q(kL − kH )
> eBL
= 1
kL + 1−pLpL (kL − kH )
⇔ (1 − pL)
2
p2L
q < 1 (3′)
(1 − pL)2
p2L
q = (1 − pL)
2
p2L
p3L
3
(1−pL)2
3 + 2 (1−pL)pL2 + p2L
= (1 − pL)
2 pL
3
(1−pL)2
3 + 2 (1−pL)pL2 + p2L
<
(1 − pL)2 pL3
(1−pL)2
3
≤ 1
The reason for this enhanced efficiency is that the principal distorts the low-ability
agent in order to lower the rents to the high-ability agent. To see this, note that the
informational rents in the Benchmark treatment (2e) are increasing in eBL , so the prin-
cipal prefers to lower eBL (thus reducing efficiency) in order to get higher profits. But
in the EA treatment there is a competitive pressure on the high-ability types. In fact, it
is easy to check that in the general model where the principal confronts n agents, the
difference between the equilibrium and the efficient level of effort for the low-ability
type goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
Nevertheless, there is an additional problem with this treatment. We have found
the equilibrium by assuming that the high-ability types assume that other high-ability
types choose the high contract. But that is not the unique equilibrium here. In the sec-
ond stage, where a menu is offered, it is also possible that both types of agents select
the low option for the menu. If all agents are choosing the low option, it is indeed a
best response to choose low for all of them. But in this case, it need not be optimal
to propose the menu of contracts specified in (3). In the design of the experiment we
provide another menu, which is the equilibrium under the assumption that whenever
there is multiplicity of equilibria in the second stage, the worst equilibrium for the
8
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principal is selected. The equilibrium menu in that case would solve:
max
wH ,wL,eH ,eL
(1 − p3L)(eH − wH) + p3L(eL − wL),
subject to wL − kL2 (eL)2 ≥ U (IRL)
wH − kH2 (eH )
2 ≥ 1
3
(
wL − kH2 (eL)
2
)
+ 2
3
U (ICH )
(4)
where the incentive constraint now ensures that it is dominant to choose the high
option for a high-ability type (thus she will do it independently of what other individ-
uals of her type are doing).8 Choosing the high contract when the low contract gives
a higher payoff makes sense to reduce competition from other workers. In fact the
‘attractiveness’ of the high contract increases with the probability that a competing
worker also chooses the high option. So the worst-case scenario for the principal is
when no competitor chooses the high contract. If even in that case a high type should
choose the high over the low contract, then it is dominant for a high-ability type to
choose the high option, and that is exactly what the ICH constraint in (4) does.
Finally, we also have a treatment (Excess Principals, or EP) where two principals
compete for one agent. In that case, competition among principals forces the equi-
librium of the game to give agents the maximum possible rents subject to incentive
compatibility. A candidate for equilibrium would thus be a menu of contracts where
agents make the efficient level of effort and principals make zero profits for each type
of contract.
eEPH = wEPH ; eEPL = wEPL ;
eEPL =
1
kL
; eEPH =
1
kH
(5)
We just need to check at this point that this menu of contracts is incentive compatible
to show that it is an equilibrium.9 This is true whenever:
1
kH
− 1
2
kH
(
1
kH
)2
≥ 1
kL
− 1
2
kH
(
1
kL
)2
(6)
1
kL
− 1
2
kL
(
1
kL
)2
≥ 1
kH
− 1
2
kL
(
1
kH
)2
(7)
8If the contract offered by the principal did not satisfy the (ICH ) constraint in program (4), there would
be a pooling equilibrium in the contract acceptance subgame, where both the H and L types would accept
the L contract. To see this, notice that the utility for the H type of accepting the H contract would be:
wH − kH2 (eH )2, since by being the only agent departing from the pooling strategy, he would guarantee
being chosen. On the other hand, if he chose to accept the L contract he would get a utility of: 13 (wL −
kH
2 (eL)
2) + 23 U , since he would only be chosen one-third of the time. Thus, if the (ICH ) constraint in
program (4) is violated it is indeed optimal for the H type to pool with the L type. If the pooling equilibrium
is always selected when available, the optimal way to screen types is given by the solution to (4). As usual,
one still has to check that screening types is optimal for the principal.
9This equilibrium can be shown to be unique. See, e.g. von Siemens (2010), who shows this in Proposi-
tion 2 for a more general version of this model.
9
A. Cabrales et al.
But notice that (6) and (7) are equivalent to
1 ≥ 1
2
kH
(
1
kH
+ 1
kL
)
(8)
1
2
kL
(
1
kH
+ 1
kL
)
≥ 1 (9)
One can easily check that (8) and (9) are indeed satisfied for the parameters of our
experiment, kL = 2, kH = 1.
We implemented the theoretical model in our experiment by choosing a single set
of six menus allowable in all contracts. For the parameter values kL = 2, kH = 1,
pL = 1/2, (3) leads to menu 1, (4) induces menu 2, (2) leads to menu 3, and (5) in-
duces menu 6.10 We provide the details of these mappings into experimental payoffs
in Sect. 3. In addition we chose two non-equilibrium menus, in order to provide a
richer contractual environment. Menu 4 is similar to menu 3, but has a little more
effort for the low-ability type, and respects the IC constraint for the high-ability type.
Menu 5 is fully efficient, for both types.
Each menu consisted of a choice of two (enforceable) effort levels and payments
that depend on the type of agent involved; if neither choice seemed attractive to the
agent, she could veto the contract menu. We chose kL = 2 for all menus, in order
to give relatively large rents to the high-ability type (under her preferred contracts).
The parameters, efforts, and wages for the six different menus in the experiment are
summarized in Table 1.
One of the criticisms of models of contract design with hidden information is that
the contract menus are more ‘complex’ than one observes in reality. In an environ-
ment like ours, these often employ a nonlinear structure and a very large number
of possible choices of pairs of wages and efforts. Using a continuous strategy space
would be quite complicated to design for the principal, and even the choice of the
agent would not be simple without adding much insight; this would also make the
Table 1 Parameter values
Menu kL pL eH eL wH wL
1 2 1/2 1 0.36 0.64 0.25
2 2 1/2 1 0.23 0.64 0.18
3 2 1/2 1 0.33 0.70 0.25
4 2 1/2 1 0.4 0.75 0.33
5 2 1/2 1 0.50 0.85 0.44
6 2 1/2 1.50 0.50 1.50 0.50
10Due to a misunderstanding, the correct theoretical parameter values were not used for Menus 5 and 6.
Instead of these menus, there should be a menu with parameters eH = 1, eL = 0.5, wH = 1 and wL = 0.5.
This would be the equilibrium menu in the excess-principals treatment. Nevertheless, given the available
menus in Table 3, Menu 6 is the equilibrium one in the EP treatment, as it is the menu that leads to the
highest utility for the agents and it is incentive compatible. The only real difference is that the rents for the
high-type agent are somewhat smaller.
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data analysis problematic. We have selected a relatively small number of menus of
contracts; since they include all forms of equilibrium in some versions of the game,
this number is sufficiently large for exploring how the choice of contracts is affected
by relative bargaining power. While we have selected a very simple structure (only
two types), we feel that a ‘simple’ menu can serve as an approximation for a full
schedule.
4 Experimental design
We conducted three different treatments, which differed according to the numbers
of principals and agents in the treatment to study how offered contracts depend on
the structure of bargaining power. In our B treatment, there were 10 principals and
10 agents in each session. In the EA treatment, there were four principals and 12
agents, while in the EP treatment, there were 12 principals and six agents.11 In
all cases, there were equal numbers of high-ability (H) agents and low-ability (L)
agents and this was made common knowledge among the participants. In order to
observe roughly similar numbers of observations (matches) in each treatment, we
conducted four sessions of the EA treatment, three sessions of the EP treatment, and
two sessions of the B treatment. Each session consisted of 40 periods of play to al-
low for possible learning dynamics, with random and anonymous re-matching after
every period. The re-matching procedure was common information to the partici-
pants.
The organization of our sessions is summarized in Table 2. The participants were
privately informed of their roles; agents were also informed of their type. One’s role
and/or type were kept constant throughout the session. The participants also knew
that there were the same number of L and H agents in the room.
In our B treatment, the “proposer” (principal) first makes a selection from among
the six “offers” (feasible contract menus). The “responder” (agent) is informed of
this choice, and then selects “option X” (high contract), “option Y” (low contract),
Table 2 Treatments and sessions
Treatment Participants per session Sessions Periods Observations
Principals H-agents L-agents
Benchmark 10 5 5 2 40 800
Excess Agent 4 6 6 4 40 640
Excess Principal 12 3 3 3 40 720
Total 72 43 43 9 – 2160
11We chose three agents per principal in the EA treatment because the theoretical model shows that the
distortion between the efficient level of effort and the equilibrium effort reduces in the number of compet-
ing agents; in addition, it increases the probability to be matched with at least one high agent. In the EP
treatment, we chose to match two principals with one agent, as the theoretical predictions are unaffected
by adding more principals.
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or rejects the contract menu. Each person then learns his or her payoff and play then
continues on to the next period. The sequence in the EA treatment is similar, except
that the principal is informed of the options chosen by each of the three agents and
then selects one of these agents. No agent is informed about the choices of the two
other agents. The EP treatment has the same sequence as the B treatment, with the
proviso that an agent can accept at most one offer from the two principals with whom
she is paired. When both principals make the same offer, the agent chooses at random
between them if she is willing to accept the offer. The principal is not informed of the
offer of the other principal.
We used the parameter values in Table 1 to generate experimental payoffs for the
feasible contract menus. We first derived the payoffs from these parameters to three
decimals and then multiplied these by one thousand. We next rounded these payoffs
to the nearest multiple of 5. In the case of the principals, we added 250 to each of the
non-rejection payoffs; this reflects the notion that setting up the firm requires some
capital, and the minimum level of revenues that are needed to recoup the cost of cap-
ital is 250. In the case of the agents, we added 10 to each non-rejection payoff, in
order to provide some minimal separation (avoiding the possibility of equilibrium
failure due to indifference) between the payoff for a low agent who accepts the least
favorable offer and her payoff from rejecting the contract menu in its entirety.12 Un-
matched principals or agents received 125 points in the period.13 This process leads
to Table 3.
A form of Table 3 was distributed to the subjects to help them to make their deci-
sions.14
The sessions were conducted at the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique
(GATE), Lyon, France. Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in
local Engineering and Business schools using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). All the par-
ticipants were inexperienced in this type of game and no one participated in more
than one session. On average, a session lasted 60 minutes, including initial instruc-
tions. The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program developed at
GATE (Zeiliger 2000). We used a conversion rate of 100 points for each Euro. At the
end of each session, we selected randomly four of the 40 periods for actual payment.
In this way, we avoided possible income effects from having already accumulated a
known amount of money in the session. The average payoff was 14.9 Euros in the B
treatment, and 13.5 Euros in both the EA and the EP treatments; on average the prin-
12As it happens, we inadvertently added 20 points to the L payoffs from option Y with menu 4. Perhaps
this turns out to be useful for testing what is needed to obtain efficiency. The reason is that even with this
extra kick, the B treatment is least efficient once rejections are considered. Thus, there is an argument that
competition between agents is good for efficiency because it reduces informational rents, both in theory
and in practice. And that principal competition enhances efficiency as it reduces the envy-driven rejections
that hurt efficiency in the benchmark.
13We note that adding the same constant to the payoffs for all agents or to the payoffs for all principals
cannot change the equilibrium, since these are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
14The instructions are part of the on-line material that can be found on the journal web-site.
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Table 3 Payoff table
Option X Option Y Reject
Menu 1
P 610 355 125
H 150 200 125
L −350 135 125
Menu 2
P 605 305 125
H 155 160 125
L −345 135 125
Menu 3
P 550 335 125
H 210 200 125
L −310 145 125
Menu 4
P 500 350 125
H 260 230 125
L −240 160 125
Menu 5
P 400 310 125
H 360 325 125
L −140 200 125
Menu 6
P 250 250 125
H 385 385 125
L −740 260 125
cipals received 17 Euros, the high-ability agents 13 Euros and the low-ability agents
10 Euros, including a four Euro show-up fee.
5 Experimental results
An overview of our experimental results is that we find substantial treatment effects
in our sessions, with large differences in the contract menus offered and accepted,
substantially in line with the equilibrium predictions. The menus that are offered (and
accepted) evolve over time. In general, rejections and competition drive behavior. We
first give descriptive statistics for principal behavior and agent behavior. We then
consider the determinants of such behavior, providing statistical tests and regression
analysis.
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5.1 Descriptive statistics
5.1.1 Principal behavior
While there is certainly heterogeneity present among the principals, we do observe
some clear patterns and differences for the menus chosen in each treatment. Table 4
lists the menus offered in each treatment; the left panel considers the full 40 periods
of the game, while the right panel considers only the last 20 periods to show the
evolution of contract offers over time.
Table 4 provides some support for the equilibrium predictions, as 30.25% of the
menus offered in the B treatment, 33.59% of the menus offered in the EA treatment,
and 46.74% of the menus offered in treatment EP are equilibrium menus (menus 1
and 2 with EA, menu 3 with B , and menu 6 with EP). However, the mode of the
distribution corresponds to the equilibrium menu only in the EP treatment. Indeed,
menu 4 is the most common choice in the B treatment (45.13% of the offers) and
menu 3 is the most common choice in the EA treatment (54.38% of the offers). As
these menus offer a more egalitarian distribution than the equilibrium menus in both
the B and EA treatments and also provides greater efficiency (higher total payoffs),
one might suspect that social preferences such as those expressed in the Charness and
Rabin (2002) model play a role here. However, if these deviations were only driven
by the principals’ intrinsic social preferences, we should expect to observe them from
the beginning of the game. Instead, the menus offered evolve over time, as indicated
by the right panel of Table 4.15
Indeed, in both the B and the EA treatments, the contracts offered deviate from
the equilibrium even further in the last 20 periods. In this set of periods, menu 4
represents 54.50% of the offers and the equilibrium menu 3 only 25.75% of the offers
in the B treatment; menu 3 represents 62.19% of the offers while the equilibrium
menus 1 or 2 represents only 27.82% of the offers on the EA treatment. Since it is
Table 4 Menus offered by treatment
Menu Menus offered in all periods Menus offered in the last 20 periods
B treatment EA treatment EP treatment B treatment EA treatment EP treatment
1 89 (11.12) 181 (28.28) 56 (3.89) 29 (7.25) 75 (23.44) 14 (1.94)
2 17 (2.12) 34 (5.31) 28 (1.94) 7 (1.75) 14 (4.38) 9 (1.25)
3 242 (30.25) 348 (54.38) 57 (3.96) 103 (25.75) 199 (62.19) 23 (3.19)
4 361 (45.13) 58 (9.06) 136 (9.44) 218 (54.50) 24 (7.50) 42 (5.83)
5 75 (9.38) 16 (2.50) 490 (34.03) 36 (9.00) 7 (2.19) 191 (26.53)
6 16 (2.00) 3 (0.47) 673 (46.74) 7 (1.75) 1 (0.31) 441 (61.25)
Total 800 (100) 640 (100) 1440 (100) 400 (100) 320 (100) 720 (100)
Note: Equilibrium menus are in bold and percentages are in parentheses
15Figures illustrating this evolution over time can be found in the Online Appendix at the Experimental
Economics website.
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the ex ante more generous menus that grow in frequency over time, it seems that
some other force is inducing principals to choose them more often over time, even
though principals’ social preferences possibly also account for these choices. This
is not contradicted by the observations from the EP treatment, since if the share of
the equilibrium menu 6 increases over time (representing 46.74% across all periods
but 61.25% in the last 20 periods), this menu also corresponds to the most generous
menu.
While we postpone an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the contract menu
choices, it appears that the profitability of a particular contract menu depends greatly
on the environment. We find that menus 1 and 2 yield among the highest average
profits to the principals in the EA treatment (516 and 528 points, respectively), but
generate among the lowest average profits in the B (270 and 210 points, respec-
tively) and EP treatments (146 and 125 points, respectively). Similarly, menu 6 is
quite unattractive for the principal in the EA and B treatments (yielding 250 points
on average in both), but provides nearly the best profits in EP (214 points compared
to 219 provided by menu 5). Overall, we observe a good correspondence between
the most frequent offers made and their profitability. For example, menu 4 ex post
yields higher profits for the principals than the equilibrium menu 3 in the B treatment
(392 vs. 334 points). Thus, to a large extent, it seems that principals are influenced
by considerations of their own profits.
5.1.2 Agent behavior
The menus accepted by the agents naturally mirror the menus that were offered; how-
ever, there are some substantial differences, due primarily to rejections in the B treat-
ment and selection pressures in the EP treatment. Table 5 displays the number of ac-
cepted contracts and the acceptance rate for each menu, by treatment and by agent’s
type. In total, there are 800 observations in the B treatment, 1920 in the EA treatment
(since there is one offer for three agents), and 1440 observations in the EP treatment
(since there are two principals for one agent).
When they accept an offer, low-ability agents rarely (14 of 1477 times for all
treatments pooled together, or 0.95%) chose option X (high effort), which would
generate negative earnings. The behavior of high-ability agents is more complex.
Note that option X pays more than option Y for high-ability types with menus 3–5,
but option Y pays more with menus 1 and 2. In addition, both options give the same
payoff to the high-ability type with menu 6. In the EP treatment, high-ability agents
nearly always maximize own payoffs (356 of 360 non-rejections). While they also do
so with menus 1, 2, 5, and 6 in treatment B , we observe a substantial proportion of
option-Y choices with menus 3 and 4 (42% and 21% of the non-rejection choices,
respectively). In the EA treatment, the principals know the agents’ choices prior to
selecting one, so that agents must compete in their choices to be selected. High-
ability agents do maximize own profits with menus 3–5, since this maximization also
coincides with maximizing the profits for the principal. However, with menus 1 and 2,
an agent who myopically chooses option Y runs the risk that she will not be selected
if another agent has chosen option X. Since some agents appear to realize this, we see
that 64% of the high-ability agents choose option X when accepting menus 1 or 2.
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Table 5 Acceptance rates, by treatment and type
Menu offer B treatment EA treatment EP treatment
High type Low type High type Low type High type Low type
1 36/45 18/44 271/286 212/257 1/20 4/36
(80) (41) (95) (82) (5) (11)
2 6/10 2/7 46/49 47/53 0/11 0/17
(60) (29) (94) (89) (0) (0)
3 97/103 85/139 513/522 446/522 2/23 2/34
(94) (61) (98) (85) (9) (6)
4 191/200 134/161 82/82 92/92 10/59 18/77
(96) (83) (100) (100) (17) (23)
5 37/37 36/38 16/16 32/32 102/260 99/230
(100) (95) (100) (100) (39) (43)
6 5/5 11/11 5/5 4/4 245/347 235/326
(100) (100) (100) (100) (71) (72)
Total 372/400 286/400 933/960 833/960 360/720 358/720
(93) (72) (97) (87) (50) (50)
Note: These numbers represent accepted contracts over offered contracts. Equilibrium menus are in bold
and percentages are in parentheses
There is some evidence of learning over time as this percentage increases from 58%
in the first 20 periods to 73% in the last 20 periods. In contrast, in response to the
offer of menu 3, the corresponding percentage (95%) for choosing option X is stable
over time.
As a consequence of these decisions, the proportion of high-ability agents actually
recruited is larger in EA (81%) than in B (57%). While in B this distortion of the ini-
tial distribution of the population reflects the higher frequency of rejections of offers
by low-ability agents, in EA this reflects the process of selection related to the com-
petitive environment. In EP, the proportion of high-ability agents (50%) corresponds
roughly to the initial distribution of the population since almost all the agents accept
an offer.
5.2 Regression analysis
We now turn to multiple-regression analysis of the determinants of the observed be-
havior in each treatment, first considering the menus offered by principals. 16,17
16All of these estimations used robust standard errors and clustering at the individual level to account for
the fact that a same individual makes several decisions over time.
17We also performed nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, with both session-level and
individual-level data (see Appendix A). These tests find that the average menu offered is lowest in the
EA sessions and highest in the EP sessions. They also indicate that rejection rates of menus below 4 are
significantly higher in the B than in the EA treatments and that high-ability agents in B are more likely to
choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 than in EA, the reverse being true for menu 3. Overall, they
show that the proportion of high-ability agents is higher in EA than in B .
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Table 6 Determinants of the choice of menus in the Benchmark Treatment
Baseline Ref.: Offer of the equilibrium Ref.: Offer of the most frequent
treatment menu 3 menu 4 in both t − 1 and t
Offer of Offer of Offer of Switch from Switch from
menus 1–2 menu 4 menus 5–6 menus 1, 2 or 3 in t − 1 menus 5 or 6 in t − 1
Time trend −0.051∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.080∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.015)
Current 0.043∗∗ −0.053∗∗ 0.014 0.044a 0.045
rejection rate (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
X option chosen −1.366∗∗∗ 0.176 −0.355 −1.557∗∗∗ −0.765∗∗∗
in (t − 1) (0.432) (0.171) (0.334) (0.457) (0.257)
Constant −0.376 −0.053 −1.183∗∗∗ 0.216 −1.467∗∗
(0.440) (0.292) (0.462) (0.526) (0.587)
Nb obs. 641 316
Log-likelihood −701.339 −200.879
Wald χ2 38.06 65.26
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.112
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering
at the individual level
aindicates borderline significance at 10.2% level
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively
5.2.1 Principal behavior
In order to disentangle the motivations underlying offers of the different categories
of menus in the B treatment, we estimate a multinomial Logit model in which the
reference category of the dependent variable is the offer of the equilibrium menu 3
(see the first three columns of Table 6). The two other categories correspond either
to the offer of menu 1 or 2, or to the offer of menu 5 or 6. This model does not
make any assumption about the order between the menus offered. Next, we estimate
multinomial Logit models to explain the offer of the most frequent contract, i.e. menu
4 in the B treatment (see the last two columns in Table 6). The reference category
is the offer of menu 4 both in period t and in period t − 1. The other categories
correspond to the switch to menu 4 in period t from menus 1, 2 or 3 offered in period
t − 1 and to the switch to menu 4 from menus 5 or 6 offered in period t − 1.
In all the regressions, the independent variables include a time trend (i.e. the pe-
riod index). They also control for the agent’s choice of high effort (option X) in the
previous period and the current rejection rate (defined as the current proportion of
periods in which an offer from the principal has been rejected). These three variables
are intended to capture how principals modify their behavior depending on their cu-
mulative experience over time.
Relative to the equilibrium menu 3, menus 1 and 2 are chosen less frequently over
time. A principal who experiences a high proportion of rejections of his previous
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offers is more likely to offer menus 1–2 and less likely to offer menu 4. This may
suggest some inertia in behavior. Indeed, a principal who is driven by social prefer-
ences makes more generous offers, experiences fewer rejections, and is encouraged
to continue to offer generous menus. An agent choosing the X option in the previ-
ous period decreases the likelihood of menu 1 or 2 being chosen by the principal as
offering these menus would induce both types to switch to the low option.
The last two columns show that switching from any menu to the most frequent
menu 4 is more frequent at the beginning of the game. It is less likely if the agent has
chosen the X option in the previous period. The experience of a high proportion of
rejections in the past exerts a borderline significant effect on switching from menus
1, 2 or 3 to the more generous menu 4. In contrast, offering very generous menus
5 or 6 is not conditioned on these variables and could be motivated by an uncondi-
tional preference for more egalitarian outcomes (or a fear of rejection without having
previously experienced this rejection).
Table 7 presents the estimates of two multinomial Logit models studying the de-
terminants of the menus chosen in the Excess Agent treatment. In the first model,
the reference category is the offer of the equilibrium menus 1 or 2 pooled together.
The first two columns correspond respectively to the offer of menu 3 and the offer of
menus 4 to 6 (pooled, since they represent only 12% of the observations). The sec-
ond model studies the determinants of the switch to the most frequent menu offered.
The reference category is the offer of menu 3 in both periods t − 1 and t . The other
Table 7 Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Agent Treatment
Excess-Agent Ref.: Offer of the Ref.: Offer of the most frequent
treatment equilibrium menu 1–2 menu 3 in both t − 1 and t
(Multinomial Offer of Offer of Switch from Switch from
Logit) menu 3 menu 4, 5 or 6 menus 1, 2 in t − 1 menus 4, 5 or 6 in t − 1
Time trend 0.019∗∗ −0.021 −0.022 −0.040∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
X option chosen 1.673∗∗∗ 0.345 −1.885∗∗∗ −0.183
in (t − 1) (0.464) (0.369) (0.342) (0.744)
X option ∗ menu 1–2 −3.679∗∗∗ −2.228∗∗∗ – –
in (t − 1) (0.738) (0.695)
Constant −0.235 −0.121 −0.253 −1.432∗
(0.473) (0.456) (0.440) (0.801)
Nb obs. 624 345
Log-likelihood −466.574 −187.251
Wald χ2 34.39 39.62
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.074
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering
at the individual level
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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categories correspond to the switch to menu 3 in period t from menus 1 or 2 offered
in period t − 1 and to the switch to menu 3 from menus 4, 5 or 6 offered in period
t − 1. The independent variables include a time trend and the choice of option X in
the previous period, which is also interacted with the equilibrium menu. We do not
consider the lagged rejection rate since all the contracts are accepted.
Menu 3 is chosen more frequently over time whereas the frequency of menus 4–6
decreases but not significantly. If the X option was chosen in the previous period in
response to the offer of the equilibrium menu, this decreases the likelihood of non-
equilibrium menus being offered; since the X option leads to a higher payoff for the
principal, there is less motivation to offer a more generous menu. On the other hand,
if the X option was chosen in t − 1 (in reaction to whichever offers), this increases
the likelihood of menu 3 being chosen. If we separate out the case when menu 3 is
chosen (columns 3 and 4), we see that switching from the equilibrium menu 1–2 to
menu 3 is much less likely when the X option has been chosen in the previous period.
Table 8 presents first the estimates of a multinomial Logit model studying the
determinants of the menus chosen in the Excess Principal treatment. The reference
category is the offer of the equilibrium menu 6. The first two columns correspond
respectively to the offer of menus 1 to 4 (pooled together since they only repre-
sent 19% of the observations) and to the offer of menu 5. The third column dis-
plays the results of a Logit model in which the switch from menus 1 to 5 to the
most frequent (and equilibrium) menu offer is the explained variable. We include
among the independent variables both the acceptance of the principal’s offer in t − 1
Table 8 Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Principal Treatment
Excess-Principal Ref.: Offer of the equilibrium menu 6 Probability to switch
treatment (Multinomial Logit) from menus 1–5 in t − 1
to menu 6 (Logit)Offer of menus 1-4 Offer of menu 5
Time trend −0.083∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Acceptance of the −0.166 0.111 −3.202∗∗∗
offer in (t − 1) (0.223) (0.175) (0.329)
Current rejection rate 0.033∗∗∗ 0.012 0.022
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Constant −0.929∗ 0.392 0.971
(0.517) (0.516) (0.879)
Nb observations 1404 671
Log-likelihood −1312.510 −267.631
Wald χ2 125.25 103.66
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.352
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering
at the individual level
∗∗∗ and ∗ denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% and 10% level, respectively
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and the current rejection rate (as defined above) instead of the lagged option cho-
sen by the agent, in order not to eliminate half of the observations and because both
the principal and the high-type agent are indifferent between the two options with
menu 6.
The offer of less egalitarian menus than menu 6 decreases strongly over time.
Although the acceptance of the offer in the previous period has little effect on the
choice of any kind of menu, there is a strong and positive correlation between a high
rejection rate in the past and the offer of less generous menus. In contrast, the Logit
regression regarding switching to menu 6 shows that an offer rejected in the previous
period makes such a switch more likely, while the overall current rejection rate is no
longer significant. The switch is also more likely in the early periods of the game.
The competitive pressure to choose a favorable menu is naturally a major factor in
the principal’s choice of contract to offer.
5.2.2 Agent behavior
We next analyze the agents’ decisions of whether to accept a contract menu and
which option to choose if accepting a contract. Table 9 reports the estimates of the
probability of accepting an offer, using Probit regressions with robust standard er-
rors and clustering at the individual level. Model (1) pools the data from the B and
EA treatments and the next three models consider each treatment separately. Note
that regarding the EP treatment, we explain the likelihood of an acceptance from the
principal’s and not from the agent’s point of view since, with the exception of two
rejections of both offers, the agent always accepts one offer and selects the best one
among the two, or chooses at random in case of a tie.
The independent variables include a time trend to control for the evolution of
behavior over time and the agent’s type. They also include the menus offered in the
current and in the previous periods (except in EP since we consider the principal’s
point of view).18 Indeed, although not predicted by the model, it is possible that the
likelihood of accepting an offer is affected by the quality of offers experienced in the
past. Finally, in the regression for the EA treatment we also control for the relative
frequency of no selection in the previous periods, as it may affect the current decision
of accepting an offer whatever the menu offered.
Specifications (1)–(3) show that high-type agents are more likely to accept a
contract offer and that higher menus are more likely to be accepted. Neither of
these is particularly surprising, since high-type agents have considerably more to
lose by rejecting an offer and since higher menus are (generally) more favorable
to the agents. There is no difference in acceptance rates across agent types in
the excess-principals treatment, since agents almost always offered at least one
favorable contract menu. Finally, specification (1) indicates that agents are more
likely to accept a given contract in the excess-agent treatment than in the base-
line.
18We include one single menu variable instead of each menu value since the agents’ payoffs increase with
each higher menu value.
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Table 9 Determinants of accepting a contract offer (Probit models)
Decision to accept the B and EA Benchmark Excess Agent Excess Principal
offer Treatments Treatment Treatment Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time trend −0.001 −0.010∗∗ 0.001 −0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Excess Agent Treatment 0.793∗∗∗ – – –
(0.280)
High-type agent 0.912∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.322∗∗∗ −0.109
(0.242) (0.395) (0.400) (0.078)
Menu offered 0.314∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗
(from 1 to 6) (0.057) (0.084) (0.079) (0.066)
Menu offered in t − 1 −0.029 −0.102∗∗ −0.021 –
(from 1 to 6) (0.035) (0.049) (0.035)
Relative frequency of – – 0.023∗∗∗ –
no selection (0.005)
Constant −0.362 −0.485 −0.742 −3.235∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.474) (0.566) (0.342)
Nb observations 2652 780 1832 1440
Log-likelihood −773.506 −291.556 −363.406 −822.684
Wald χ2 49.43 38.19 66.09 127.62
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.209 0.199 0.176
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering
at the individual level
∗∗∗
, and ∗∗ denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively
To analyze the determinants of the choice of option X once a contract has been
accepted, we have estimated a Probit model with robust standard errors and clustering
at the individual level on the data of the B and the EA treatments separately.19 The
independent variables include both a time trend (the number of the period) and the
number of the menu that has been accepted by the agent. Table 10 reports the results
of these regressions.
We see that the higher the contract, the more likely the high agent is to choose
option X (B treatment: marginal effect = 0.273; EA treatment: marginal effect =
0.104). The marginal effect of the menu offered is lower in EA than in the B treat-
ment, probably due to the competitive pressure. Option X is chosen less frequently
over time in the B treatment (marginal effect = −0.005), as it seems that high-ability
19Since low-type agents incur serious losses if they choose the X option, we only consider high-type agents
here. We also omit the EP treatment since payoffs are identical for options X and Y when the equilibrium
menu is offered.
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Table 10 Determinants of choosing option X for accepted contracts (Probit models)
Choise of Benchmark Treatment Excess Agent Treatment
option X (1) (2)
Time trend −0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Menu accepted (from 1 to 6) 0.746∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.090)
Constant −1.962∗∗∗ −0.408∗
(0.538) (0.220)
Nb observations 372 933
Log-likelihood −191.962 −341.993
Wald χ2 31.39 37.74
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.159
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering
at the individual level
∗∗∗
, and ∗∗ denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively
agents develop a taste for more favorable contracts and make modest sacrifices by
choosing Y instead of X (rather than costly rejections) to punish the principal for a
lack of generosity in choosing menus that give them lower payoffs. In contrast, option
X is chosen more frequently over time in the EA treatment (marginal effect = 0.003)
since the high-ability agents also learn to make modest sacrifices, by choosing X
instead of Y when they accept contracts 1 or 2, to increase the likelihood of their
hiring.
Not surprisingly, the higher the contract, the more likely the high agent is to
choose option X (B treatment: marginal effect = 0.273; EA treatment: marginal
effect = 0.104). The marginal effect of the menu offered is lower in EA than in the
B treatment, probably due to the competitive pressure. Option X is chosen less fre-
quently over time in the B treatment (marginal effect = −0.005), as it seems that
high-ability agents develop a taste for more favorable contracts and make modest
sacrifices by choosing Y instead of X (rather than costly rejections) to punish the
principal for a lack of generosity in choosing menus that give them lower payoffs. In
contrast, option X is chosen more frequently over time in the EA treatment (marginal
effect = 0.003) since the high-ability agents also learn to make modest sacrifices, by
choosing X instead of Y when they accept contracts 1 or 2, to increase the likelihood
of their hiring.
5.3 Welfare and efficiency comparisons
Welfare comparisons across treatments are complicated because in EA and EP there
is an unbalanced structure of principals and agents, so that some parties remain un-
matched. The right assumption in this case, we think, is to consider only the individ-
uals who are actually matched; equivalently, one might think of this is as how much
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benefit society derives from a match. More importantly, the numbers of matches with
the high-ability agents is likely to be higher in the EA treatment, which necessarily
gives a boost to the total payoffs in this treatment.
With the contract menus and payoff parameters we chose, we find that the greatest
benefits accrue to society when there are many agents competing. The average total
payoffs are 698.97, 538.46, and 590.42 in the EA, B , and EP treatments, respectively;
thus, the EA treatment easily yields the highest average total payoff. One reason for
this is that (ex post) every contract is accepted by at least one of the paired agents in
the EA treatment. The EP treatment slightly dominates B in terms of average total
payoff since only two agents reject the offer of both principals, while the B treatment
has a substantial rejection rate.
Nevertheless, even if we consider only accepted contracts, the EA treatment still
generates the highest degree of efficiency, with average total payoffs of 698.97,
600.71, and 591.36 in the EA, B , and EP treatments, respectively. Mann-Whitney
tests find that the total payoffs are higher in EA than in both B (Z = 1.85 and
p = 0.06) and EP (Z = 2.14 and p = 0.03). One reason why EA empirically yields
higher payoffs than B or EP is that the possibility of selection means that there are
more matches with high-ability agents in EA (81%, against 57% in B and 50% in
EP) and these yield higher total payoffs per match. Nevertheless, even if there were
an equal number of matches with high- and low-ability agents in EA, it would still be
the treatment with the highest total payoffs, either with or without rejections (615.04).
However, the conclusion about the higher efficiency of the EA institutional envi-
ronment should be qualified if we account for those agents who get unmatched. If the
EA environment provides the biggest benefit to society from a match, it may generate
a higher social cost than the benchmark if the unmatched agents remain unemployed.
6 Conclusion
We conducted an experiment based on a model of contracting under asymmetric in-
formation. We show theoretically that, in this context, various degrees of relative
bargaining power affect outcomes and efficiency. In this environment, efficiency im-
proves in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ infor-
mational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates high inequality
levels and is characterized by multiple equilibria, which may have important behav-
ioral implications in the field and suggests that empirical testing could produce valu-
able insights.
Our results provide qualitative support for the theory. We find that the institu-
tional environment in which agents compete against each other improves efficiency
with respect to a situation without competition. We also show that behavior evolves
over time. People make errors, learn and adjust their decisions accordingly in order
to increase their payoffs. In particular, the payoff obtained in the previous period,
especially related to the ability to separate between types, is a driving force of the
evolution of principals’ menu offers. Our results also indicate that principals offer
more generous menus than predicted, although less frequently in the context of com-
petition.
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These results offer some insight into the interaction between the various degrees
of bargaining power and social preferences. In many experimental papers, the out-
comes do not correspond to the predictions of standard contract theory; this is often
considered to stem from some form of social preferences. In our treatment without
competition, we observe that principals offer more generous contract menus than in
the equilibrium. When agents compete, principals tend also to offer more generous
contract menus than the equilibrium, but this is less the case when they are able to
separate the agents by type with the equilibrium menus; this calls into question the
true generosity of these offers. In addition, the existence of social preferences can
hardly change the outcome for the low-ability type agents: due to the heterogeneity
among agents, offering a more generous menu increases the selected agent’s expected
payoff but also increases the likelihood of the repeated exclusion of the low-ability
agents.
Finally, the superiority of the institutional environment with competition among
agents is shown in terms of total surplus of the matched pairs. The higher total sur-
plus is achieved by making the payoff of the principal higher and lowering those of
the agents. Thus, there is a genuine tradeoff between equity and efficiency in this
environment, both theoretically and empirically.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A: Nonparametric tests
Our nonparametric tests are Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, conducted
with both session-level and individual-level data. In a strict sense each session is
only one independent observation, since there is interaction between parties over the
course of each session. Table A presents a summary of principal and agent choices in
each of our sessions.
The average contract menu offered is lowest in the four EA sessions and highest
in the three EP sessions. Rank-sum tests find Z = 2.12 and p = 0.03, comparing
between EA and EP, Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06 for the comparison between EA and B ,
and Z = 1.73 and p = 0.08 for the comparison between B and EP. The likelihood
Table A Session-level data
Variables B treatment EA treatment EP treatment
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9
Average offer 3.41 3.50 2.53 2.51 2.07 3.04 5.08 5.11 5.05
Rejection rates (M 1, 2 & 3) 0.23 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.04 – – –
High agent-option X (M 1& 2) 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.50 0.82 0.56 – – –
High agent-option X (M 3) 0.75 0.26 0.87 0.96 1.00 0.96 – – –
% high type (actual contracts) 0.56 0.57 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.50
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that EA < B < EP (for average menu offered) is only p = 0.004. Principals offer
significantly different contract menus in each treatment.
We also see that rejection rates of the less generous menus (1–3) are substantially
higher in both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, yielding Z = 1.85
and p = 0.06.20 In addition, high-ability agents in the B treatment are less likely to
choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 than are high-ability agents in the
EA treatment (insufficient observations in the EP treatment); recall that the myopic
profit-maximizing choice in the EA treatment is Y. As the rate is lower in both B
sessions than in any of the four EA sessions; this gives Z = 1.88 and p = 0.06. The
rate of option X being chosen by the high agent is lower in both B sessions than in
any of the four EA sessions, with Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06. This is consistent with the
fact that the offer of menu 3 is already more ‘generous’ than the equilibrium in the
EA treatment. Finally, the proportion of high-ability agents in the actual contracts is
higher in the EA sessions than in the B sessions (Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06) and it is
smaller than a random draw of 0.875 (p = 0.04, t -test). This proportion is also higher
in the B than in the EP sessions (p = 0.08) and it is larger than a random draw of
0.50 (p = 0.01, t -test).
Since we have only a few sessions in each treatment, we supplement these tests
by collapsing the 40 choices of each participant to one number; while this approach
ignores the interaction between parties, we feel it is nevertheless informative. These
results confirm the patterns above, but with a higher degree of statistical significance.
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests find that there are significant differences in the
average menu offered between each pair of treatments (Z = 3.99,5.71, and 5.69 for
EA vs. B , EA vs. EP, and B vs. EP, respectively; all of these test statistics give p <
0.001). The test also indicates that the rejection rates of menus 1–3 are significantly
higher in the B treatment than in the EA treatment (Z = 2.60,p = 0.01). Finally,
the test confirms that the proportion of high-ability agents in the actual contracts is
larger in the EA than in the B treatment (Z = 4.36,p < 0.001) but this test fails when
comparing the B and EP treatments (Z = 1.56,p = 0.11).
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